Learning in Cournot Oligopoly - An Experiment
Steffen Huck (),
Hans-Theo Normann () and
Game Theory and Information from University Library of Munich, Germany
This experiment was designed to test various learning theories in the context of a Cournot oligopoly. We derive theoretical predictions for the learning theories and test these predictions by varying the information given to subjects. The results show that some subjects imitate successful behavior if they have the necessary information, and if they imitate, markets are more competitive. Other subjects follow a best reply process. On the aggregate level we find that more information about demand and cost conditions yields less competitive behavior, while more information about the quantities and profits of other firms yields more competitive behavior.
Keywords: learning; Cournot oligopoly; experiments; imitation; best; reply process (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997-07-18, Revised 1997-07-22
Note: Type of Document - ; pages: 38 ; figures: included
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations View citations in EconPapers (8) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Journal Article: Learning in Cournot Oligopoly--An Experiment (1999)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9707009
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Game Theory and Information from University Library of Munich, Germany
Bibliographic data for series maintained by EconWPA ().