Through Trial & Error to Collusion

Steffen Huck, Hans-Theo Normann and Jörg Oechssler

Game Theory and Information from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: In this note we study a very simple trial & error learning process in the context of a Cournot oligopoly. Without any knowledge of the payoff functions players increase, respectively decrease, their quantity by one unit as long as this leads to higher profits. We show that this process converges to a collusive outcome.

Keywords: learning; game theory; oligopoly; collusion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998-11-19, Revised 1998-11-24
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-gth and nep-mic
Note: Pages: 12; figure included in the second file
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Downloads: (external link)
https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econ-wp/game/papers/9811/9811004.pdf (application/pdf)
https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econ-wp/game/papers/9811/9811004.ps.gz (application/postscript)

Related works:
Working Paper: Through trial & error to collusion (1999)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9811004

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Game Theory and Information from University Library of Munich, Germany
Bibliographic data for series maintained by EconWPA ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).