Firm wage premia, industrial relations, and rent sharing in Germany

Boris Hirsch and Steffen Müller
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Steffen Mueller

No 2/2018, IWH Discussion Papers from Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH)

Abstract: This paper investigates the influence of industrial relations on firm wage premia in Germany. OLS regressions for the firm effects from a two-way fixed effects decomposition of workers' wages by Card, Heining, and Kline (2013) document that average premia are larger in firms bound by collective agreements and in firms with a works council, holding constant firm performance. RIF regressions show that premia are less dispersed among covered firms but more dispersed among firms with a works council. Hence, deunionisation is the only among the suspects investigated that contributes to explaining the marked rise in the premia dispersion over time.

Keywords: firm wage premium; industrial relations; trade unions; works councils; bargaining power; rent sharing; wage inequality; Germany (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J31 J52 J53 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/174354/1/1012334023.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Firm Wage Premia, Industrial Relations, and Rent Sharing in Germany (2020)
Working Paper: Firm Wage Premia, Industrial Relations, and Rent Sharing in Germany (2018)
Working Paper: Firm Wage Premia, Industrial Relations, and Rent Sharing in Germany (2018)
Working Paper: Firm wage premia, industrial relations,and rent sharing in Germany (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:iwhdps:22018

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