Firm Wage Premia, Industrial Relations, and Rent Sharing in Germany

Boris Hirsch and Steffen Müller ()
Additional contact information
Steffen Müller: IWH Halle
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Steffen Mueller

No 11309, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: This paper investigates the influence of industrial relations on firm wage premia in Germany. OLS regressions for the firm effects from a two-way fixed effects decomposition of workers' wages by Card, Heining, and Kline (2013) document that average premia are larger in firms bound by collective agreements and in firms with a works council, holding constant firm performance. RIF regressions show that premia are less dispersed among covered firms but more dispersed among firms with a works council. Hence, deunionization is the only among the suspects investigated that contributes to explaining the marked rise in the premia dispersion over time.

Keywords: rent sharing; bargaining power; works councils; trade unions; industrial relations; firm wage premium; wage inequality; Germany (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J31 J52 J53 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 38 pages
Date: 2018-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-eur and nep-lma
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

Published - revised version published in: Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 2020, 73 (5), 1119-1146

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https://docs.iza.org/dp11309.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Firm Wage Premia, Industrial Relations, and Rent Sharing in Germany (2020)
Working Paper: Firm Wage Premia, Industrial Relations, and Rent Sharing in Germany (2018)
Working Paper: Firm wage premia, industrial relations,and rent sharing in Germany (2018)
Working Paper: Firm wage premia, industrial relations, and rent sharing in Germany (2018)
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