Stackelberg beats Cournot: On collusion and efficiency in experimental markets

Steffen Huck, Wieland Müller and Hans-Theo Normann

No 1999,32, SFB 373 Discussion Papers from Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes

Abstract: We report on an experiment designed to compare Stackelberg and Cournot duopoly markets with quantity competition. For each market we implement both a random matching and fixed-pairs version. Stackelberg markets yield, regardless of the matching scheme, higher outputs than Cournot markets. Under random matching total quantities in Stackelberg markets are higher than predicted by the subgame perfect equilibrium while total quantities in the Cournot markets match the equilibrium prediction. Under fixed pairs aggregate output for both, Cournot and Stackelberg, is lower than under random matching, but there is less collusion on Stackelberg markets and, hence, higher efficiency.

Date: 1999
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/61775/1/722260857.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Stackelberg Beats Cournot: On Collusion and Efficiency in Experimental Markets (2001)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:sfb373:199932

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in SFB 373 Discussion Papers from Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics ().