Awards at work

Susanne Neckermann, Reto Cueni and Bruno Frey

No 12-004, ZEW Discussion Papers from ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research

Abstract: Social incentives like employee awards are widespread in the corporate sector and may be important instruments for solving agency problems. To date, we have little understanding of their effect on behavior. Unique panel data from the call center of a Fortune 500 financial services provider allow us to estimate the impact of awards on performance. Winning an award for voluntary work behaviors significantly increases subsequent core call center performance. The effect is short-lived, mainly driven by underperforming agents, and is reflected mostly in dimensions of the job that are hard to observe.We discuss various theories that could explain the effect.

Keywords: Awards; Motivation; Non-monetary Compensation; Insider Econometrics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C23 J33 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hrm
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Awards at work (2014)
Working Paper: Awards at work (2010)
Working Paper: Awards at work (2010)
Working Paper: Awards At Work (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:zewdip:12004

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