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Games and Economic Behavior

1989 - 2017

Current editor(s): E. Kalai

From Elsevier
Series data maintained by Dana Niculescu ().

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Volume 4, issue 4, 1992

It takes two to tango: Equilibria in a model of sales pp. 493-510 Downloads
Michael Baye, Dan Kovenock and Casper de Vries
Conventions, social prejudices and discrimination: A festival game with merrymakers pp. 511-527 Downloads
Mamoru Kaneko and Toshiyuki Kimura
The complexity of two-person zero-sum games in extensive form pp. 528-552 Downloads
Daphne Koller and Nimrod Megiddo
The small worlds axiom for stable equilibria pp. 553-564 Downloads
Jean-François Mertens
Coalition-proof nash equilibria and the core in three-player games pp. 565-581 Downloads
Benny Moldovanu
The multilinear extension and the coalition structure value pp. 582-587 Downloads
Guillermo Owen and Eyal Winter
The least core, nucleolus, and kernel of homogeneous weighted majority games pp. 588-605 Downloads
Bezalel Peleg and Joachim Rosenmuller
Credible assignments in coordination games pp. 606-626 Downloads
John van Huyck, Ann B. Gillette and Raymond Battalio
Optimal pricing against a simple learning rule pp. 627-649 Downloads
Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden

Volume 4, issue 3, 1992

Simultaneous signaling through investment in an R& D game with private information pp. 327-346 Downloads
Reiko Aoki and David Reitman
A battle-of-the-sexes game with incomplete information pp. 347-372 Downloads
Jeffrey Banks and Randall L. Calvert
Welfare bounds in the cooperative production problem pp. 373-401 Downloads
Herve Moulin
Coalition formation under limited communication pp. 402-421 Downloads
Edward C. Rosenthal
Cheap talk games may have unique, informative equilibrium outcomes pp. 422-425 Downloads
Daniel Seidmann
Folk theorems in overlapping generations games pp. 426-449 Downloads
Lones Smith
On self-enforcement in extensive-form games pp. 450-462 Downloads
Jörgen Weibull
Continuous implementation in economics with incomplete information pp. 463-483 Downloads
David Wettstein
On nash implementation of social choice correspondences pp. 484-492 Downloads
Takehiko Yamato

Volume 4, issue 2, 1992

A unique solution to n-person sequential bargaining pp. 169-181 Downloads
Geir Asheim
Correlated equilibrium with generalized information structures pp. 182-201 Downloads
Adam Brandenburger, Eddie Dekel and John Geanakoplos
The exponential convergence of Bayesian learning in normal form games pp. 202-217 Downloads
J. S. Jordan
Equilibrium refinement in psychological games pp. 218-231 Downloads
Van Kolpin
Short-rune stable matchings between bees and flowers pp. 232-251 Downloads
Bezalel Peleg and A. Shmida
Self-optimality and efficiency in utility distortion games pp. 252-260 Downloads
Hans Peters
Mixed strategies in strictly competitive games: A further test of the minimax hypothesis pp. 261-283 Downloads
Amnon Rapoport and Richard B. Boebel
Dominated strategies and common knowledge pp. 284-313 Downloads
Larry Samuelson
Game theory: By Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1991. 608 pp., $35.00 pp. 314-317 Downloads
Charles A. Wilson

Volume 4, issue 1, 1992

On being honest and behaving honestly pp. 1-17 Downloads
Moshe Adler
Imperfect equilibrium pp. 18-36 Downloads
Avraham Beja
Risk sharing with competition pp. 37-57 Downloads
Gary Biglaiser
Strategic claim games corresponding to an NTU-game pp. 58-71 Downloads
Peter Borm and S. H. Tijs
Coalitions, leadership, and social norms: The power of suggestion in games pp. 72-100 Downloads
Peter DeMarzo
The good, the bad, and the ugly: Coalition proof equilibrium in infinite games pp. 101-121 Downloads
Charles Kahn and Dilip Mookherjee
On platers with a bounded number of states pp. 122-131 Downloads
Christos H. Papadimitriou
The consistency and potential for values of games with coalition structure pp. 132-144 Downloads
Eyal Winter
The hybrid solutions of an N-person game pp. 145-160 Downloads
Jingang Zhao
Two-sided matching: A study in game-theoretic modeling and analysis: By Alvin E. Roth and Marilda A. Oliveira Sotomayor, Econometric Society Monographs, Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, MA, 1990. 265 + xiii pp., $54.50 (hardback) pp. 161-165 Downloads
Uriel G. Rothblum

Volume 3, issue 4, 1991

Uniqueness of equilibrium for smooth multistage concave games pp. 393-402 Downloads
Murray Brown, Shin-Hwan Chiang and Kenji Yamamoto
Constrained egalitarian allocations pp. 403-422 Downloads
Bhaskar Dutta and Debraj Ray
Delayed agreements and nonexpected utility pp. 423-437 Downloads
Chaim Fershtman, Zvi Safra and Daniel Vincent
Discriminatory von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions pp. 438-452 Downloads
Johannes G. C. Heijmans
Sequential bargaining in a market with one seller and two different buyers pp. 453-466 Downloads
Ebbs Hendon and Torben Tranaes
Collusion in second price auctions with heterogeneous bidders pp. 467-486 Downloads
George Mailath and Peter Zemsky
The core of an m-sided assignment game pp. 487-503 Downloads
Thomas Quint

Volume 3, issue 3, 1991

Maxmin and minmax for coalitional game forms pp. 267-277 Downloads
Joseph Abdou
Extending renegotiation-proofness to infinite horizon games pp. 278-294 Downloads
Geir Asheim
Do people exploit their bargaining power? An experimental study pp. 295-322 Downloads
Ken Binmore, Peter Morgan, Avner Snaked and John Sutton
Competitively cost advantageous mergers and monopolization pp. 323-338 Downloads
Morton I. Kamien and Israel Zang
Stable payoffs in resale-proof trades of information pp. 339-349 Downloads
Mikio Nakayama and Luis Quintas
The positive value of information pp. 350-355 Downloads
Abraham Neyman
Pure-strategy [epsiv]-Nash equilibrium in two-person non-zero-sum games pp. 356-367 Downloads
Tadeusz Radzik
The graph of Prisoners' Dilemma supergame payoffs as a function of the discount factor pp. 368-384 Downloads
Dale Stahl
Axiomatic theory of bargaining with a variable number of agents: By W. Thomson and T. Lensberg, Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, MA, 1989. 230 pp., $39.50 pp. 385-387 Downloads
Herve Moulin
Game theory: Analysis of conflict: By Roger B. Myerson, Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, MA, 1991. 568 pp., $45.00 pp. 387-391 Downloads
Ehud Kalai

Volume 3, issue 2, 1991

A note on equalization in extensive form games pp. 157-162 Downloads
Gustavo Bergantino and Ignacio Garcia-Jurado
The Pareto set of the partition bargaining problem pp. 163-182 Downloads
Daniel Granot and Uriel G. Rothblum
Testing for effects of cheap talk in a public goods game with private information pp. 183-220 Downloads
Thomas Palfrey and Howard Rosenthal
Forward induction and sunk costs give average cost pricing pp. 221-236 Downloads
Jean-Pierre Ponssard
A note on robustness of equilibria with respect to commitment opportunities pp. 237-243 Downloads
Robert Rosenthal
A repeated game with finitely lived overlapping generations of players pp. 244-259 Downloads
David Salant
Bargaining and markets: By Martin J. Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein, Academic Press, San Diego, 1990. ISBN 0-12-528631-7, xi + 216 pp., $14.95 Paper, $34.50 hardbound pp. 260-264 Downloads
Ken Binmore

Volume 3, issue 1, 1991

Evolution, learning, and economic behavior pp. 3-24 Downloads
Reinhard Selten
An "evolutionary" interpretation of Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil's experimental results on coordination pp. 25-59 Downloads
Vincent Crawford
Bayesian learning in normal form games pp. 60-81 Downloads
J. S. Jordan
Adaptive and sophisticated learning in normal form games pp. 82-100 Downloads
Paul Milgrom and John Roberts
Viscous population equilibria pp. 101-109 Downloads
Roger Myerson, Gregory B. Pollock and Jeroen Swinkels
Limit evolutionarily stable strategies in two-player, normal form games pp. 110-128 Downloads
Larry Samuelson
Prestable strategies in discounted duopoly games pp. 129-144 Downloads
William Stanford
Cooperation in the long-run pp. 145-156 Downloads
H. Young and Dean Foster
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