Games and Economic Behavior

1989 - 2013

Edited by E. Kalai

from Elsevier
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Volume 37, issue 2, 2001

Prices in Mixed Cost Allocation Problems pp. 243-258

Emilio Calvo and Juan Carlos Santos

A Bayesian Model of Voting in Juries pp. 259-294

John Duggan and Cesar Martinelli

Monotone Games with Positive Spillovers pp. 295-320

Douglas Gale

Alternative Semantics for Unawareness pp. 321-339

Joseph Halpern

A Behavioral Learning Process in Games pp. 340-366

Jean-François Laslier, Richard Topol and Bernard Walliser

Maximal Domain of Preferences in the Division Problem pp. 367-387

Jordi Masso and Alejandro Neme

Player Types and Self-Impression Management in Dictatorship Games: Two Experiments pp. 388-414

J. Keith Murnighan, John M. Oesch and Madan Pillutla

Game Theory via Revealed Preferences pp. 415-424

Indrajit Ray and Lin Zhou

Substantive Rationality and Backward Induction pp. 425-435

Joseph Halpern

Coalition Formation and Potential Games pp. 436-448

Marco Slikker

Volume 37, issue 1, 2001

Adaptive Learning versus Punishment in Ultimatum Bargaining pp. 1-25

Klaus Abbink, Gary E. Bolton, Abdolkarim Sadrieh and Fang-Fang Tang

Large Nonanonymous Repeated Games pp. 26-39

Nabil . Al-Najjar and Rann Smorodinsky

Voting for Voters: A Model of Electoral Evolution pp. 40-78

Salvador Barberà, M. Maschler and Jonathan Shalev

Evolution of Communication with Partial Common Interest pp. 79-120

Andreas Blume, Douglas V. DeJong, Yong-Gwan Kim and Geoffrey B. Sprinkle

On Money Pumps pp. 121-160

Robin Cubitt and Robert Sugden

The Relevance of Equal Splits in Ultimatum Games pp. 161-169

Werner Guth, Steffen Huck and Wieland Müller

Perfect Equilibria in a Model of Bargaining with Arbitration pp. 170-195

Paola Manzini and Marco Mariotti

Manipulation of Preferences and Relative Utilitarianism pp. 196-215

Joel Sobel

Cooperation, Secret Handshakes, and Imitation in the Prisoners' Dilemma pp. 216-242

Thomas Wiseman and Okan Yilankaya

Volume 36, issue 2, 2001

Cycles of Aggregate Behavior in Theory and Experiment pp. 105-137

Antoni Bosch-Domènech and Maria Saez-Marti

Reference Points and Negative Reciprocity in Simple Sequential Games pp. 138-157

Jordi Brandts and Carles Sola

Debates and Decisions: On a Rationale of Argumentation Rules pp. 158-173

Jacob Glazer and Ariel Rubinstein

Average Monotonic Cooperative Games pp. 174-192

Josep M. Izquierdo and Carles Rafels

Epsilon Cores of Games with Limited Side Payments: Nonemptiness and Equal Treatment pp. 193-218

Alexander Kovalenkov and Myrna Wooders

Optimality and Robustness of the English Auction pp. 219-240

Lopomo, Giuseppe (Pino)

Some Surprising Properties of Power Indices pp. 241-263

Donald G. Saari and Katri K. Sieberg

Cooperation in an Overlapping Generations Experiment pp. 264-275

Theo Offerman, Jan Potters and Harrie A. A. Verbon

Volume 36, issue 1, 2001

In Memoriam: John C. Harsanyi 1920-2000 pp. 1-1

Ehud Kalai

Eulogy to My Father: John C. Harsanyi, 1920-2000 pp. 2-4

Tom Harsanyi

In Memoriam: John C. Harsanyi pp. 5-6

Kenneth J. Arrow

Harsanyi's Sweater pp. 7-8

Robert J. Aumann

Creativity and Acclaim pp. 9-10

Ken Binmore

Sociological Thinking pp. 11-11

Laszlo Cseh-Szombathy

Homage from a Student pp. 12-12

Mary Macgregor

My Encounters with John Harsanyi pp. 13-14

Michael Maschler

Achievement Against Odds pp. 15-18

C. Bart McGuire

Harsanyi's Intellectual Legacy pp. 19-19

Simona Morini

Learning Game Theory from John Harsanyi pp. 20-25

Roger B. Myerson

A Friend and Colleague pp. 26-27

Nelson N. Polsby

A Personal Tribute to John Harsanyi pp. 28-29

Paul A. Samuelson

A Letter to the Editor pp. 30-30

Tibor Scitovsky

John C. Harsanyi, System Builder and Conceptual Innovator pp. 31-46

Reinhard Selten

Postscript pp. 47-50

Reinhard Selten

Branching Time, Perfect Information Games, and Backward Induction pp. 57-73

Giacomo Bonanno

Sequential Auctions of Endogenously Valued Objects pp. 74-103

Ian L. Gale and Mark Stegeman

Volume 35, issue 1-2, 2001

Economics and Artificial Intelligence pp. 1-5

Dov Monderer, Moshe Tennenholtz and Hal Ronald Varian

Coordinated Action in the Electronic Mail Game pp. 6-30

Ken Binmore and Larry Samuelson

Probability Logic for Type Spaces pp. 31-53

Aviad Heifetz and Philippe Mongin

Expected Qualitative Utility Maximization pp. 54-79

Daniel Lehmann

Learning in Network Contexts: Experimental Results from Simulations pp. 80-123

Amy Greenwald, Eric J. Friedman and Scott Shenker

Multiagent Cooperative Search for Portfolio Selection pp. 124-165

David C. Parkes and Bernardo A. Huberman

Algorithmic Mechanism Design pp. 166-196

Noam Nisan and Amir Ronen

On Rational Computability and Communication Complexity pp. 197-211

Yoav Shoham and Moshe Tennenholtz

Leveled Commitment Contracts and Strategic Breach pp. 212-270

Tuomas W. Sandholm and Victor R. Lesser

Auction Protocols for Decentralized Scheduling pp. 271-303

Michael Wellman, William E. Walsh, Peter R. Wurman and Jeffrey Mackie-Mason

A Parametrization of the Auction Design Space pp. 304-338

Peter R. Wurman, Michael Wellman and William E. Walsh

Equilibria in Automated Interactions pp. 339-348

Nir Vulkan