Optimal Contracts with Lock-In

Joseph Farrell () and Carl Shapiro

Department of Economics, Working Paper Series from Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley

Keywords: switching costs; lock-in; long-term relationships; contracts; opportunism; Social and Behavioral Sciences; Business (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1987-10-12
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Related works:
Journal Article: Optimal Contracts with Lock-In (1989)
Working Paper: Optimal Contracts with Lock-In (1987)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cdl:econwp:qt19f324hf

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