School choice with farsighted students

Ata Atay, Ana Mauleon () and Vincent Vannetelbosch ()
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Ata Atay: University of Barcelona
Ana Mauleon: Université catholique de Louvain, LIDAM/CORE, Belgium
Vincent Vannetelbosch: Université catholique de Louvain, LIDAM/CORE, Belgium

No 3319, LIDAM Reprints CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: We consider priority-based school choice problems with farsighted students. We show that a singleton set consisting of the matching obtained from the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism is a farsighted stable set. However, the matching obtained from the Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism may not belong to any farsighted stable set. Hence, the TTC mechanism provides an assignment that is not only Pareto efficient but also farsightedly stable. Moreover, looking forward three steps ahead is already sufficient for stabilizing the matching obtained from the TTC. In addition, we show that variations of TTC that improve in terms of no justified envy are farsightedly stable, but may require more farsightedness on behalf of students.

Keywords: School choice; Top trading cycle; Stable sets; Farsighted students (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 16
Date: 2025-01-01
Note: In: Games and Economic Behavior, 2025, vol. 149, p. 148-163
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvrp:3319

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.010

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