Collective Brand Reputation

Volker Nocke and Roland Strausz

No 15732, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We develop a theory of collective brand reputation for markets in which product quality is jointly determined by local and global players. In a repeated game of imperfect public monitoring, we model collective branding as a pooling of quality signals generated in different markets. Such pooling yields a beneficial informativeness effect for the actions of a global player present in all markets, but also harmful free-riding by local, market-specific players. The resulting tradeoff yields a theory of optimal brand size and revenue sharing, applying to platform markets, franchising, licensing, umbrella branding, and firms with team production.

Keywords: Collective branding; Reputation; Free riding; Repeated games; Imperfect monitoring (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-gth, nep-ipr and nep-mic
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Related works:
Journal Article: Collective Brand Reputation (2023)
Working Paper: Collective Brand Reputation (2022)
Working Paper: Collective Brand Reputation (2021)
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