Political Power and Market Power

Bo Cowgill, Andrea Prat and Tommaso Valletti

No 17178, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We study the link between political influence and industrial concentration. A model of firm lobbying shows that concentration and regulation may be either strategic complements or substitutes. Using data for the past 20 years in the US, we study whether merging firms’ influence activity increases or decreases after a merger. We document an increase in lobbying activity and we find some evidence for an increase in campaign contributions.

Date: 2022-04
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Working Paper: Political Power and Market Power (2024)
Working Paper: Political Power and Market Power (2023)
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