The Political Effects of the 1918 Influenza Pandemic in Weimar Germany

Stefan Bauernschuster, Erik Hornung and Christoph Koenig

No 18277, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: How do health crises affect election results? We combine a panel of election results from 1893--1933 with spatial heterogeneity in excess mortality due to the 1918 Influenza to assess the pandemic's effect on voting behavior across German constituencies. Applying a dynamic differences-in-differences approach, we find that areas with higher influenza mortality saw a lasting shift towards left-wing parties. We argue that pandemic intensity increased the salience of public health policy, prompting voters to reward parties signaling competence in health issues. Alternative explanations such as pandemic-induced economic hardship, punishment of incumbents for inadequate policy responses, or polarization of the electorate towards more extremist parties are not supported by our findings.

Keywords: Pandemics; Elections; Health; Voting behavior (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H51 I18 N34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-07
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Related works:
Journal Article: The political effects of the 1918 influenza pandemic in Weimar Germany (2025)
Working Paper: The Political Effects of the 1918 Influenza Pandemic in Weimar Germany (2023)
Working Paper: The Political Effects of the 1918 Influenza Pandemic in Weimar Germany (2023)
Working Paper: The Political Effects of the 1918 Influenza Pandemic in Weimar Germany (2023)
Working Paper: The Political Effects of the 1918 Influenza Pandemic in Weimar Germany (2023)
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