Fiscal Divergence and Business Cycle Synchronization: Irresponsibility is Idiosyncratic

Szapáry, György, Andrew Rose and Zsolt Darvas
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: György Szapáry

No 5188, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: Using a panel of 21 OECD countries and 40 years of annual data, we find that countries with similar government budget positions tend to have business cycles that fluctuate more closely. That is, fiscal convergence (in the form of persistently similar ratios of government surplus/deficit to GDP) is systematically associated with more synchronized business cycles. We also find evidence that reduced fiscal deficits increase business cycle synchronization. The Maastricht 'convergence criteria', used to determine eligibility for EMU, encouraged fiscal convergence and deficit reduction. They may thus have indirectly moved Europe closer to an optimum currency area, by reducing countries' abilities to create idiosyncratic fiscal shocks. Our empirical results are economically and statistically significant, and robust.

Keywords: European; Monetary; Union; Policy; Maastricht; Criteria; Optimum; Mundell (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eec, nep-mac and nep-pbe
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (111)

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Related works:
Chapter: Fiscal Divergence and Business Cycle Synchronization: Irresponsibility is Idiosyncratic (2005)
Working Paper: Fiscal Divergence and Business Cycle Synchronization: Irresponsibility is Idiosyncratic (2005)
Working Paper: Fiscal Divergence and Business Cycle Synchronization: Irresponsibility is Idiosyncratic (2005)
Working Paper: Fiscal Divergence and Business Cycle Synchronization: Irresponsibility is Idiosyncratic (2005)
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