Organizational Prospects, Influence Costs, and Ownership Changes

Margaret Meyer, Paul Milgrom and John Roberts

No 665, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We augment efficiency-based theories of ownership by including influence costs. Our principal conclusion is that the prospect of organizational decline and layoffs creates additional influence costs in multi-unit organizations that would be absent if there were no prospect of layoffs and would be lessened or eliminated in focused organizations. This helps explain the tendency of firms to divest poorly performing units, as well as the pattern of sales of such units to firms already in businesses related to that of the divested unit.

Keywords: Acquisitions and Mergers; Divestitures; Firm Boundaries; Influence Costs; Ownership; Politics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D21 D23 G34 L22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1992-06
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (180)

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Journal Article: Organizational Prospects, Influence Costs, and Ownership Changes (1992)
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