Curbing Cream-Skimming: Evidence on Enrolment Incentives

Pascal Courty, Gerald Marschke and Do Han Kim

No 7121, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: Using data from a large, U.S. federal job training program, we investigate whether enrolment incentives that exogenously vary the ?shadow prices? for serving different demographic subgroups of clients influence case workers? intake decisions. We show that case workers enroll more clients from subgroups whose shadow prices increase but select at the margin weaker-performing members from those subgroups. We conclude that enrolment incentives curb cream-skimming across subgroups leaving a residual potential for cream-skimming within a subgroup.

Keywords: Bureaucrat behavior; Cream-skimming; Enrolment incentives; Performance measurement; Public organizations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H72 J33 L14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab
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Related works:
Journal Article: Curbing cream-skimming: Evidence on enrolment incentives (2011)
Working Paper: Curbing cream-skimming: Evidence on enrolment incentives (2009)
Working Paper: Curbing Cream-Skimming: Evidence on Enrolment Incentives (2008)
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