Multi-Stage Sequential All-Pay Auctions

Aner Sela and Ella Segev

No 8949, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We study multi-stage sequential all-pay contests (auctions) where heterogeneous contestants are privately informed about a parameter (ability) that affects their cost of effort. We characterize the sub-game perfect equilibrium of these multi-stage sequential all-pay contests and analyze the effect of the number of contestants, their types, and their order on the expected highest effort.

Keywords: All-pay auctions; Sequential contests (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP8949 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Multi-stage sequential all-pay auctions (2014)
Working Paper: MULTI-STAGE SEQUENTIAL ALL-PAY AUCTIONS (2012)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:8949

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP8949

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CEPR ().