Fixed-Mobile Integration

Steffen Hoernig and Carlo Cambini
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Marc Bourreau

No 9361, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: Often, fixed-line incumbents also own the largest mobile network. We consider the effect of this joint ownership on market outcomes. Our model predicts that while fixed-to-mobile call prices to the integrated mobile network are more efficient than under separation, those to rival mobile networks are distorted upwards, amplifying any incumbency advantage. As concerns potential remedies, a uniform off-net pricing constraint leads to higher welfare than functional separation and even allows to maintain some of the efficiency gains.

Keywords: Call externality; Integration; Network competition; On/off-net pricing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L51 L92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-net and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Fixed-mobile integration (2014)
Working Paper: Fixed-mobile integration (2014)
Working Paper: Fixed-mobile integration (2013)
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