Information in Mechanism Design

Dirk Bergemann and Juuso Välimäki

No 1532R, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: We survey the recent literature on the role of information in mechanism design. First, we discuss an emerging literature on the role of endogenous payoff and strategic information for the design and the efficiency of the mechanism. We specifically consider information management in the form of acquisition of new information or disclosure of existing information. Second, we argue that in the presence of endogenous information, the robustness of the mechanism to the type space and higher order beliefs becomes a natural desideratum. We discuss recent approaches to robust mechanism design and robust implementation.

Keywords: Mechanism Design; Information Acquisition; Ex Post Equilibrium; Robust Mechanism Design; Interdependent Values; Information Management (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C79 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 42 pages
Date: 2005-08, Revised 2006-01
Note: CFP 1208
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (33)

Published in Blundell, Newey and Persson, eds., Proceedings of the 9th World Congress of the Econometric Society, Cambridge University Press, 2006, pp. 186-221

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Working Paper: Information in Mechanism Design (2006)
Working Paper: Information in Mechanism Design (2005)
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