Selling Information

Johannes Hörner and Andrzej Skrzypacz

No 1743R2, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: An Agent who owns information that is potentially valuable to a Firm bargains for its sale, without commitment and certification possibilities, short of disclosing it. We propose a model of gradual persuasion and show how gradualism helps mitigate the hold-up problem (that the Firm would not pay once it learns the information). An example illustrates how it is optimal to give away part of the information at the beginning of the bargaining, and sell the remainder in dribs and drabs. The Agent can only appropriate part of the value of information. Introducing a third-party allows her to extract the maximum surplus.

Keywords: Value of information; Dynamic game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 58 pages
Date: 2009-12, Revised 2012-11
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Selling Information (2016)
Working Paper: Selling Information (2013)
Working Paper: Selling Information (2011)
Working Paper: Selling Information (2010)
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