School choice with farsighted students
Ata Atay,
Ana Mauleon and
Vincent Vannetelbosch
Games and Economic Behavior, 2025, vol. 149, issue C, 148-163
Abstract:
We consider priority-based school choice problems with farsighted students. We show that a singleton set consisting of the matching obtained from the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism is a farsighted stable set. However, the matching obtained from the Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism may not belong to any farsighted stable set. Hence, the TTC mechanism provides an assignment that is not only Pareto efficient but also farsightedly stable. Moreover, looking forward three steps ahead is already sufficient for stabilizing the matching obtained from the TTC. In addition, we show that variations of TTC that improve in terms of no justified envy are farsightedly stable, but may require more farsightedness on behalf of students.
Keywords: School choice; Top trading cycle; Stable sets; Farsighted students (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:149:y:2025:i:c:p:148-163
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.010
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