Careers in organizations: Theory and evidence

Robert Gibbons and Michael Waldman

Chapter 36 in Handbook of Labor Economics, 1999, vol. 3, Part B, pp 2373-2437 from Elsevier

Abstract: We survey the theoretical literature on careers in organizations, focusing on models that address detailed evidence or stylized facts. We begin with what we call building-block models: human-capital acquisition, job assignment, incentive contracting, efficiency wages, and tournaments. We then show how these building blocks can be combined and enriched to address various aspects of careers. We first focus on applied models aimed at outcomes familiar from labor economics: wage growth in the absence of promotions, promotions used for job assignment, promotions used to provide incentives, and separation. We then consider topics more often discussed in human resource management and organization theory than in labor economics: politics, social relations, and work practices. We end by reviewing three models that address broad patterns of detailed evidence rather than a few stylized facts.

JEL-codes: J0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (187)

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