On the likelihood of dummy players in weighted majority games

Fabrice Barthélémy (), Dominique Lepelley and Mathieu Martin

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Abstract: When the number of players is small in a weighted majority voting game, it can occur that one of the players has no influence on the result of the vote, in spite of a strictly positive weight. Such a player is called a "dummy" player in game theory. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the conditions that give rise to such a phenomenon and to compute its likelihood. It is shown that the probability of having a dummy player is surprisingly high and some paradoxical results are observed.

Keywords: Economics general; Economic Theory; Revue AERES (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in Social Choice and Welfare, 2012, 41 (2), pp.263--279. ⟨10.1007/s00355-012-0683-1⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: On the likelihood of dummy players in weighted majority games (2013)
Working Paper: On the Likelihood of Dummy players in Weighted Majority Games (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01243433

DOI: 10.1007/s00355-012-0683-1

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