Ex-ante versus Ex-post in Competition Law Enforcement: Blurred Boundaries and Economic Rationale

Patrice Bougette (), Oliver Budzinski and Frédéric Marty
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Patrice Bougette: UniCA - Université Côte d'Azur, GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis (1965 - 2019) - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UniCA - Université Côte d'Azur

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Abstract: This paper explores the evolving landscape of competition law enforcement, focusing on the dynamic interplay between ex-ante and ex-post approaches. Amidst the digital transformation and regulatory shifts, traditional enforcement mechanisms are being re-evaluated. This study aims to dissect the economic rationale behind these shifts, proposing a hybrid framework that balances legal certainty with the flexibility needed to address contemporary market challenges.

Keywords: Competition Law Enforcement; Ex-ante and Ex-post Approaches; Anticompetitive Practices; Merger Control; Digital Economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-06-07
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Related works:
Working Paper: Ex-ante versus Ex-post in Competition Law Enforcement: Blurred Boundaries and Economic Rationale (2025)
Working Paper: Ex-ante versus Ex-post in Competition Law Enforcement: Blurred Boundaries and Economic Rationale (2024)
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