Non-Profit Organizations in a Bureaucratic Environment

Paul Grout and Wendelin Schnedler

No 3685, IZA Discussion Papers from IZA Network @ LISER

Abstract: How does the environment of an organization influence whether workers voluntarily provide effort? We study the power relationship between a non-profit unit (e.g. university department, NGO, health trust), where workers care about the result of their work, and a bureaucrat, who supplies some input to the non-profit unit, but has opportunity costs in doing so (e.g. Dean of faculty, corrupt representative, government agency). We find that marginal changes in the balance of power eventually have dramatic effects on donated labor. We also identify when strengthening the non-profit unit decreases and when it increases donated labor.

Keywords: power within organizations; donated labor; intrinsic motivation; non-profit organizations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H10 H40 L30 M50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 38 pages
Date: 2008-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab and nep-soc
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Related works:
Working Paper: Non-Profit Organizations in a Bureaucratic Environment (2008)
Working Paper: Non-profit organizations in a bureaucratic environment (2008)
Working Paper: Non-Profit Organizations in a Bureaucratic Environment (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iza:izadps:dp3685

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