Managerial Payoff and Gift-Exchange in the Field

Florian Englmaier and Stephen Leider

Munich Reprints in Economics from University of Munich, Department of Economics

Abstract: We conduct a field experiment where we vary both the presence of a gift-exchange wage and the effect of the worker's effort on the manager's payoff. Results indicate a strong complementarity between the initial wage-gift and the agent's ability to "repay the gift". We control for differences in ability and reciprocal inclination and show that gift-exchange is more effective with more reciprocal agents. We present a principal-agent model with reciprocal subjects that motivates our findings. Our results help to reconcile the conflicting evidence on the efficacy of gift-exchange outside the lab.

Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Published in Review of Industrial Organization 2 56(2020): pp. 259-280

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Related works:
Journal Article: Managerial Payoff and Gift-Exchange in the Field (2020)
Working Paper: Managerial Payoff and Gift-Exchange in the Field (2019)
Working Paper: Managerial Payoff and Gift Exchange in the Field (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lmu:muenar:84721

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