Promises or Agreements? Moral commitments in bilateral communication

Giovanni Di Bartolomeo (), Martin Dufwenberg, Stefano Papa and Francesco Passarelli

No 229, Working Papers in Public Economics from Department of Economics and Law, Sapienza University of Roma

Abstract: Messages may trigger moral incentives to honor promises or agreements in a game with pre-play bilateral communication. We hypothesize that individuals’ inclination to keep a promise is highest if the counterpart requited the promise. We interpret this as an inclination to honor agreements. We report supporting results from an experiment.

Keywords: Guilt aversion; promise-keeping; informal agreements (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A13 C91 D03 D64 D90 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 8
Date: 2022-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-gth
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Related works:
Journal Article: Promises or agreements? Moral commitments in bilateral communication (2023)
Working Paper: Promises or Agreements? Moral commitments in bilateral communication (2022)
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