Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study

Caterina Calsamiglia, Guillaume Haeringer and Flip Klijn

American Economic Review, 2010, vol. 100, issue 4, 1860-74

Abstract: The literature on school choice assumes that families can submit a preference list over all the schools they want to be assigned to. However, in many real-life instances families are only allowed to submit a list containing a limited number of schools. Subjects' incentives are drastically affected, as more individuals manipulate their preferences. Including a safety school in the constrained list explains most manipulations. Competitiveness across schools plays an important role. Constraining choices increases segregation and affects the stability and efficiency of the final allocation. Remarkably, the constraint reduces significantly the proportion of subjects playing a dominated strategy (JEL D82, I21 )

JEL-codes: D82 I21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.100.4.1860
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (141)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study (2015)
Working Paper: Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study (2009)
Working Paper: Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study (2009)
Working Paper: Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study (2008)
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