Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study

Caterina Calsamiglia, Guillaume Haeringer and Flip Klijn

UFAE and IAE Working Papers from Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC)

Abstract: The literature on school choice assumes that families can submit a preference list over all the schools they want to be assigned to. However, in many real-life instances families are only allowed to submit a list containing a limited number of schools. Subjects' incentives are drastically affected, as more individuals manipulate their preferences. Including a safety school in the constrained list explains most manipulations. Competitiveness across schools play an important role. Constraining choices increases segregation and affects the stability and efficiency of the final allocation. Remarkably, the constraint reduces significantly the proportion of subjects playing a dominated strategy.

Keywords: school choice; matching; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C78 D78 I20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31
Date: 2008-11-17
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-edu, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-ure
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study (2015)
Journal Article: Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study (2010)
Working Paper: Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study (2009)
Working Paper: Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aub:autbar:757.08

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