Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study

Guillaume Haeringer, Caterina Calsamiglia and Flip Klijn

No 2009.29, Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

Abstract: The literature on school choice assumes that families can submit a preference list over all the schools they want to be assigned to. However, in many real-life instances families are only allowed to submit a list containing a limited number of schools. Subjects' incentives are drastically affected, as more individuals manipulate their preferentes. Including a safety school in the constrained list explains most manipulations. Competitiveness across schools plays an important role. Constraining choices increases segregation and affects the stability and efficiency of the final allocation. Remarkably, the constraint reduces significantly the proportion of subjects playing a dominated strategy.

Keywords: School Choice; Matching; Experiment; Gale-Shapley; Top Trading Cycles; Boston Mechanism; Efficiency; Stability; Truncation; Truthtelling; Safety School (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C78 D78 I20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-edu, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (93)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study (2015)
Journal Article: Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study (2010)
Working Paper: Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study (2009)
Working Paper: Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fem:femwpa:2009.29

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