Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study

Caterina Calsamiglia, Guillaume Haeringer and Flip Klijn

No 50480, Sustainable Development Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Abstract: The literature on school choice assumes that families can submit a preference list over all the schools they want to be assigned to. However, in many real-life instances families are only allowed to submit a list containing a limited number of schools. Subjects' incentives are drastically affected, as more individuals manipulate their preferentes. Including a safety school in the constrained list explains most manipulations. Competitiveness across schools plays an important role. Constraining choices increases segregation and affects the stability and efficiency of the final allocation. Remarkably, the constraint reduces significantly the proportion of subjects playing a dominated strategy.

Keywords: Institutional; and; Behavioral; Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34
Date: 2009
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (70)

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https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/50480/files/29-09.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study (2015)
Journal Article: Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study (2010)
Working Paper: Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study (2009)
Working Paper: Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:feemdp:50480

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.50480

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