The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics

2002 - 2024

Current editor(s): Burkhard C. Schipper

From De Gruyter
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A Simple Linear Programming Approach to Gain, Loss and Asset Pricing pp. 10: Rodríguez Longarela Iñaki
Forward Discount Bias, Nalebuff's Envelope Puzzle, and the Siegel Paradox in Foreign Exchange pp. 11: Aaron Edlin
The Noisy Duopolist pp. 19: David Spector
Private Strategies in Finitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring pp. 23: George Mailath, Steven Matthews and Tadashi Sekiguchi
Bargaining over Risky Assets pp. 28: Muhamet Yildiz
Joint Liability and Peer Monitoring under Group Lending pp. 28: Yeon-Koo Che
Equilibrium Departures from Common Knowledge in Games with Non-Additive Expected Utility pp. 30: Sujoy Mukerji and Hyun Song Shin
Regulation by Negotiation: the Private Benefit Bias pp. 31: Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky and Pierre Picard
Local Conventions pp. 32: Jeffrey Ely
Risk Averse Supervisors and the Efficiency of Collusion pp. 32: Faure-Grimaud Antoine, Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort
The Principal-Agent Matching Market pp. 34: Kaniska Dam and David Perez-Castrillo
Spontaneous Market Emergence pp. 37: Marcel Fafchamps

Monotone Preferences over Information pp. 18: Juan Dubra and Federico Echenique
Faulty Communication: Some Variations on the Electronic Mail Game pp. 26: Stephen Morris
Regulating Endogenous Customer Switching Costs pp. 31: Joshua Gans and Stephen King
Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Finite Economies pp. 34: Harold Cole, George Mailath and Andrew Postlewaite
Bilateral Trade and Opportunism in a Matching Market pp. 35: Garey Ramey and Joel Watson
Incentives and Coordination in Hierarchies pp. 38: Dilip Mookherjee and Reichelstein Stefan
Reinforcement Learning in Repeated Interaction Games pp. 44: Jonathan Bendor, Dilip Mookherjee and Debraj Ray
Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding pp. 44: Ausubel Lawrence M and Paul Milgrom
Incomplete Contracts. Non-Contractible Quality, and Renegotiation pp. 47: Christoph Lülfesmann
Genericity with Infinitely Many Parameters pp. 64: Anderson Robert M. and William Zame