The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics

2002 - 2024

Current editor(s): Burkhard C. Schipper

From De Gruyter
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Volume 9, issue 2, 2009

Relative Satisfaction and Welfare Maximizing Wealth Distribution pp. 16

Coram Alex and Noakes Lyle

Volume 9, issue 1, 2009

Optimism and Bargaining Inefficiency pp. 14

Li Duozhe and Wong Yat Fung

Advertising and Cost Reduction pp. 15

Giovanni Immordino

Supply Theory sans Profit Maximization pp. 16

Indraneel Dasgupta

Envy-Free and Efficient Minimal Rights: Recursive No-Envy pp. 16

Diego Dominguez and Nicolo Antonio

Fair Depreciation: A Shapley Value Approach pp. 18

Ben-Shahar Danny and Sulganik Eyal

Product Variety, Scale Economies, and Environmental Taxes pp. 18

Vetter Henrik

A Note on Herbert Gintis' "Emergence of a Price System from Decentralized Bilateral Exchange" pp. 18

Antoine Mandel and Botta Nicola

Fluctuations in Overlapping Generations Economies pp. 19

Mich Tvede

Competition May Reduce the Revenue in a First Price Auction with Affiliated Private Values pp. 19

Domenico Menicucci

A Two-Step Subsidy Scheme to Overcome Network Externalities in a Dynamic Game pp. 20

Shichijo Tatsuhiro and Nakayama Yuji

Oligopolistic Certification pp. 21

Hans Hvide

Vertical Differentiation, Social Networks and Compatibility Decisions pp. 23

Hend Ghazzai and Rim Lahmandi-Ayed

Inflation, Self Insurance and the Friedman Rule in Economies with Uninsurable Idiosyncratic Risks pp. 23

Roy Sunanda

Incentive Schemes in Peer-to-Peer Networks pp. 24

Oksana Loginova, Lu Haibin and X. Wang

Why (and When) are Preferences Convex? Threshold Effects and Uncertain Quality pp. 24

Trenton Smith and Attila Tasnádi

Free Riding in Combinatorial First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions pp. 24

Maréchal François and Pierre-Henri Morand

Asymmetric Bertrand-Edgeworth Oligopoly and Mergers pp. 25

Daisuke Hirata

The Dynamics of Collective Reputation pp. 25

Jonathan Levin

Representations and Identities for Homogeneous Technologies pp. 25

Espinosa Miguel, Jean Bonaldi and Hernán Vallejo

Temptations in General Settings pp. 25

Igor Kopylov

Cross-Cultural Trade and Institutional Stability pp. 25

Marianna Belloc

Universal Service Obligations and Competition with Asymmetric Information pp. 25

Jean-Christophe Poudou, Roland Michel and Thomas Lionel

Monitoring Gains and Decentralization pp. 26

Bernd Theilen

Continuous Preferences and Discontinuous Choices: How Altruists Respond to Incentives pp. 28

Paul Seabright

Reputation, Career Concerns, and Job Assignments pp. 29

Leonardo Martinez

Market Competition and Lower Tier Incentives pp. 29

Bernd Theilen

Sale of a Deteriorating Asset via Sequential Search pp. 30

Lippman Steven A. and Mamer John W

Learning in Bayesian Games with Binary Actions pp. 30

Alan Beggs

Directed Search, Rationing and Wage Dispersion pp. 31

Kenjiro Hori

Simple Economies with Multiple Equilibria pp. 31

Ted Bergstrom, Ken-Ichi Shimomura and Yamato Takehiko

Risk Premiums versus Waiting-Options Premiums: A Simple Numerical Example pp. 31

Miyazaki Kenji and Makoto Saito

Private Information of Nonpaternalistic Altruism: Exaggeration and Reciprocation of Generosity pp. 32

Fong Yuk-Fai

Geometric Asymptotic Approximation of Value Functions pp. 32

Axel Anderson

Optimal Auctions with Simultaneous and Costly Participation pp. 33

Gorkem Celik and Okan Yilankaya

Contracting in the Presence of Judicial Agency pp. 34

Bond Philip

Sequential Auctions with Multi-Unit Demands pp. 35

Rodriguez Gustavo E

Principal and Expert Agent pp. 36

James Malcomson

The Efficiency of Observability and Mutual Linkage pp. 36

Zhiwei Cui, Zhai Jian and Liu Xuan

A Duopoly Model of Political Agency with Applications to Anti-Corruption Reform pp. 38

Haldun Evrenk

Satisficing: A 'Pretty Good' Heuristic pp. 38

Jonathan Bendor, Kumar Sunil and Siegel David A

Income Distribution, Market Structure, and Individual Welfare pp. 39

Alexander Tarasov

Identifying Community Structures from Network Data via Maximum Likelihood Methods pp. 40

Jernej Copic, Matthew Jackson and Alan Kirman

Consumer Rationing and the Cournot Outcome pp. 46

Lepore Jason J

A Positive Theory of Income Taxation pp. 49

Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau

Updating Ambiguity Averse Preferences pp. 53

Hanany Eran and Klibanoff Peter

Volume 8, issue 1, 2008

When Stackelberg and Cournot Equilibria Coincide pp. 7

Luca Colombo and Labrecciosa Paola

Backward Integrated Information Gatekeepers and Independent Divisions in the Product Market pp. 10

Chen Jihui

Revisiting Independence and Stochastic Dominance for Compound Lotteries pp. 11

Alexander Zimper

Time-to-Build and the Inverse U-Shape Investment-Uncertainty Relationship pp. 16

Yishay Maoz

On Competitive Equilibria with Asymmetric Information pp. 16

Jerome Pouyet, Bernard Salanié and François Salanié

Forgiving-Proof Equilibrium in Infinitely Repeated Games pp. 17

Miguel Aramendia, Ruiz Luis and Quan Wen

Passing the Buck in Sequential Negotiation pp. 18

Clark Derek J and Jean-Christophe Pereau

Global vs. Local Information in (Anti-)Coordination Problems with Imitators pp. 19

Leonardo Boncinelli

Research Joint Ventures, Optimal Licensing, and the R&D Subsidy Policy pp. 19

Fan Cuihong and Elmar Wolfstetter

Cost Pass-Through under Delegation pp. 19

Robert Ritz

Mechanism Design with Moderate Evidence Cost pp. 20

Jesse Bull

The Dirty Face Problem with Unawareness pp. 20

Zhen Liu

A Constructive Proof that Learning in Repeated Games Leads to Nash Equilibria pp. 20

Patrick Leoni

Connectivity and Allocation Rule in a Directed Network pp. 21

Jeong-Yoo Kim and Jun Tackseung

A Duopoly Location Toolkit: Consumer Densities Which Yield Unique Spatial Duopoly Equilibria pp. 23

Kieron Meagher, Ernie Teo and Wang Wen

On the Role of Uncertainty in the Risk-Incentives Tradeoff pp. 25

Rantakari Heikki V

Competing for Recognition through Public Good Provision pp. 25

Mattias K Polborn

Ex Post Private Information and Monopolistic Screening pp. 27

Krahmer Daniel and Roland Strausz

Costly Evidence Production and the Limits of Verifiability pp. 28

Jesse Bull

The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions pp. 28

Ichiro Obara

Identification of Individual Demands from Market Data under Uncertainty pp. 30

Carvajal Andres and Alvaro Riascos

Purchasing Power Parity with Strategic Markets pp. 32

Konstantinos Papadopoulos

Comparative Statics and Welfare in Heterogeneous All-Pay Auctions: Bribes, Caps, and Performance Thresholds pp. 32

Rene Kirkegaard

Conflict and Consensus: A Theory of Control in Organisations pp. 35

Banerjee Priyodorshi

Principal-Agent Problems with Exit Options pp. 43

Jaksa Cvitanic, Wan Xuhu and Zhang Jianfeng

Bidding Strategies for Simultaneous Ascending Auctions pp. 43

Michael Wellman, Osepayshvili Anna, Jeffrey Mackie-Mason and Reeves Daniel

A Categorical Model of Cognition and Biased Decision Making pp. 44

Fryer Roland and Matthew Jackson

Counter Marginalization of Information Rents: Implementing Negatively Correlated Compensation Schemes for Colluding Parties pp. 45

Gorkem Celik

Empirical Implications of Information Structure in Finite Extensive Form Games pp. 49

Penalva Jose and Michael Ryall

Herd Behavior and Contagion in Financial Markets pp. 56

Marco Cipriani and Antonio Guarino