The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics

2002 - 2024

Current editor(s): Burkhard C. Schipper

From De Gruyter
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Volume 11, issue 1, 2011

Symmetry or Dynamic Consistency? pp. 14

Larry Epstein and Seo Kyoungwon

Implementation of the Core in College Admissions Problems When Colleagues Matter pp. 14

Serkan Küçükşenel

Intertemporal Bounded Rationality as Consideration Sets with Contraction Consistency pp. 16

Dean Spears

The Benefit of Mixing Private Noise into Public Information in Beauty Contest Games pp. 17

Hiroki Arato and Nakamura Tomoya

The Survival Assumption in Intertemporal Economies pp. 18

Jean-Marc Bonnisseau and Jamin Alexandrine

A Property of Solutions to Linear Monopoly Problems pp. 18

Gregory Pavlov

When Two-Part Tariffs are Not Enough: Mixing with Nonlinear Pricing pp. 20

Steffen Hoernig and Tommaso Valletti

On the Existence and Social Optimality of Equilibria in a Hotelling Game with Uncertain Demand and Linear-Quadratic Costs pp. 22

Michal Krol

Stochastic Stability in Finitely Repeated Two Player Games pp. 24

Jack Robles

Sequential Investments, Know-How Transmission, and Optimal Organization pp. 24

Tsung-Sheng Tsai and Kung Sheng-Chiao

Network Architecture and the Left-Right Spectrum pp. 25

Dmitry Taubinsky

Transitional Dynamics in a Tullock Contest with a General Cost Function pp. 26

Martin Grossmann, Markus Lang and Helmut Dietl

Alliance Partner Choice in Markets with Vertical and Horizontal Externalities pp. 27

Keisuke Hattori and Ming Hsin Lin

A New Existence and Uniqueness Theorem for Continuous Games pp. 28

Seamus Hogan

Sellers Like Clusters pp. 28

Klaus Kultti

Multiproduct Duopoly with Vertical Differentiation pp. 29

Cheng Yi-Ling, Shin-Kun Peng and Takatoshi Tabuchi

Make-or-Buy Decisions and the Manipulability of Performance Measures pp. 30

Fredrik Andersson

Optimal Mechanism for Selling Two Goods pp. 35

Gregory Pavlov

Strategy-Proof Compromises pp. 37

Peter Postl

Strategic Choice of Preferences: the Persona Model pp. 39

Wolpert David, Jamison Julian, Newth David and Harre Michael

Information, Authority, and Corporate Hierarchies pp. 39

Chongwoo Choe and In-Uck Park

Interactive Epistemology and Solution Concepts for Games with Asymmetric Information pp. 40

Pierpaolo Battigalli, Alfredo Di Tillio, Edoardo Grillo and Antonio Penta

Input Production Joint Venture pp. 50

Rossini Gianpaolo and Cecilia Vergari

No-Trade in the Laboratory pp. 58

Marco Angrisani, Antonio Guarino, Steffen Huck and Nathan Larson

Volume 10, issue 1, 2010

Upward Pricing Pressure in Horizontal Merger Analysis: Reply to Epstein and Rubinfeld pp. 1-9

Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro

A Note on the Multidimensional Monopolist Problem and Intertemporal Price Discrimination pp. 8

Mariano Runco

Linear Demand Systems are Inconsistent with Discrete Choice pp. 8

Sonia Jaffe and Eric Weyl

Upward Pricing Pressure in Horizontal Merger Analysis: Reply to Epstein and Rubinfeld pp. 9

Farrell Joseph and Shapiro Carl

Optimal Quality Scores in Sponsored Search Auctions: Full Extraction of Advertisers' Surplus pp. 11

Kiho Yoon

Understanding UPP pp. 12

Epstein Roy J. and Rubinfeld Daniel L

Costly Renegotiation in Repeated Bertrand Games pp. 12

Ola Andersson and Erik Wengström

On Delegation in Contests and the Survival of Payoff Maximizing Behavior pp. 13

Alex Possajennikov

A Note on Rationalizability and Restrictions on Beliefs pp. 13

Giuseppe Cappelletti

The Role of Replication-Invariance: Two Answers Concerning the Problem of Fair Division When Preferences Are Single-Peaked pp. 14

Bettina Klaus

On a Class of Contest Success Functions pp. 14

Hao Jia

Vote or Shout pp. 14

Chakravarty Surajeet and Todd Kaplan

Collusive Behavior of Bidders in English Auctions: A Cooperative Game Theoretic Analysis pp. 15

Oishi Takayuki

A Theory of Credibility under Commitment pp. 15

Daniel Monte

Information Revelation in Markets with Pairwise Meetings: Complete Revelation in Dynamic Analysis pp. 17

Isaac Tanguy

The Optimal Accuracy Level in Asymmetric Contests pp. 18

Zhewei Wang

Asymmetry and Collusion in Sequential Procurement: A "Large Lot Last" Policy pp. 18

Albano Gian Luigi and Giancarlo Spagnolo

Non-Bayesian Learning pp. 20

Larry Epstein, Jawwad Noor and Sandroni Alvaro

Regular Infinite Economies pp. 21

Enrique Covarrubias

Revealed Preference with Stochastic Demand Correspondence pp. 21

Indraneel Dasgupta and Pattanaik P. K

Existence of Competitive Equilibrium in Unbounded Exchange Economies with Satiation: A Note pp. 22

Sato Norihisa

Contracting for Dynamic Efficiency pp. 22

Calcott Paul and Vladimir Petkov

Relative Extinction of Heterogeneous Agents pp. 23

Jaksa Cvitanic and Semyon Malamud

Status, Inequality and Intertemporal Choice pp. 23

Xia Bianjun

Sharing Risk Efficiently under Suboptimal Punishments for Defection pp. 24

Drew Saunders

Advice from Multiple Experts: A Comparison of Simultaneous, Sequential, and Hierarchical Communication pp. 24

Ming Li

Crime Reporting: Profiling and Neighbourhood Observation pp. 24

Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay and Chatterjee Kalyan

Optimal Screening by Risk-Averse Principals pp. 25

Suren Basov and Xiangkang Yin

Successive Oligopolies and Decreasing Returns pp. 26

Skerdilajda Zanaj

Endogenous Two-Sided Markets with Repeated Transactions pp. 27

Polanski Arnold and Eyal Winter

Ensuring Quality Provision through Capacity Regulation under Price Competition pp. 27

Nicolas Boccard and Xavier Wauthy

Endogenous Investment and Pricing under Uncertainty pp. 29

David Young

Communication Breakdown: Consultation or Delegation from an Expert with Uncertain Bias pp. 29

Rush Anthony, Vladimir Smirnov and Andrew Wait

Existence Advertising, Price Competition and Asymmetric Market Structure pp. 29

B. Eaton, MacDonald Ian A. and Laura Meriluoto

Designing the Efficient Information-Processing Organization pp. 29

Jun Tackseung and Jeong-Yoo Kim

Bertrand Competition in Markets with Fixed Costs pp. 30

Alejandro Saporiti and German Coloma

Markets versus Negotiations: The Predominance of Centralized Markets pp. 30

Zvika Neeman and Vulkan Nir

Profit-Maximizing Sale of a Discrete Public Good via the Subscription Game in Private-Information Environments pp. 31

Stefano Barbieri and David Malueg

Position Auctions with Budgets: Existence and Uniqueness pp. 32

Ashlagi Itai, Braverman Mark, Hassidim Avinatan, Lavi Ron and Tennenholtz Moshe

Quantifying the Cost of Risk in Consumption pp. 33

Mario Tirelli and Turner Sergio

Social Learning in Social Networks pp. 33

Pj Lamberson

Kinked-Demand Equilibria and Weak Duopoly in the Hotelling Model of Horizontal Differentiation pp. 34

Pierre Mérel and Sexton Richard J.

Price Regulation under Demand Uncertainty pp. 34

Veronika Grimm and Zöttl Gregor

Advice by an Informed Intermediary: Can You Trust Your Broker? pp. 35

Anton Suvorov and Tsybuleva Natalia

The Fragmentation of Reputation pp. 36

Gautam Bose

Contractual Incompleteness for External Risks pp. 36

Wang Susheng

Global Social Interactions with Sequential Binary Decisions: The Case of Marriage, Divorce, and Stigma pp. 37

Finn Christensen and Juergen Jung

Coordination under the Shadow of Career Concerns pp. 40

Alexander Koch and Morgenstern Albrecht

Antitrust Evaluation of Horizontal Mergers: An Economic Alternative to Market Definition pp. 41

Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro

Walrasian Equilibrium and Reputation under Imperfect Public Monitoring pp. 44

Bernardita Vial

First-Mover Advantage in a Dynamic Duopoly with Spillover pp. 46

Gianluca Femminis and Gianmaria Martini

Equilibrium Social Hierarchies: A Non-Cooperative Ordinal Status Game pp. 49

Haagsma Rein and Pierre Mouche

Bad Government Can Be Good Politics: Political Reputation, Negative Campaigning, and Strategic Shirking pp. 58

Fletcher Deborah and Slutsky Steven