The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics

2002 - 2024

Current editor(s): Burkhard C. Schipper

From De Gruyter
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Volume 14, issue 1, 2014

Cheap Talk and Editorial Control pp. 1-25

Jonathan Newton

Adverse Effects of Patent Pooling on Product Development and Commercialization pp. 27-57

Thomas Jeitschko and Nanyun Zhang

Discretionary Acquisition of Firm-Specific Human Capital under Non-verifiable Performance pp. 59-92

Akhmedov Akhmed and Anton Suvorov

On-the-Job Search and Finding a Good Job Through Social Contacts pp. 93-125

Gergely Horvath

Replication and Returns to Scale in Production pp. 127-148

Christian Jensen

An Adaptive Learning Model with Foregone Payoff Information pp. 149-176

Funai Naoki

A Single Parent’s Labor Supply: Evaluating Different Child Care Fees within an Intertemporal Framework pp. 177-215

Minagawa Junichi and Upmann Thorsten

Dynamic Price Discrimination with Customer Recognition pp. 217-250

Ching-jen Sun

Cournot and Bertrand Competition in a Model of Spatial Price Discrimination with Differentiated Products pp. 251-272

Sun Chia-Hung

The Impact of Voter Uncertainty and Alienation on Turnout and Candidate Policy Choice pp. 273-292

Brown Natalya R.

Trust, Truth, Status and Identity: An Experimental Inquiry pp. 293-338

Jeffrey Butler

Macro Meets Micro: Stochastic (Calvo) Revisions in Games pp. 339-369

Jan Libich and Dat Nguyen

The Robustness Case for Proportional Liability pp. 371-395

Alexander Stremitzer and Tabbach Avraham D.

The Rise and Spread of Favoritism Practices pp. 397-414

Miguel Duran and Antonio Morales

Moral Hazard and Tradeable Pollution Emission Permits pp. 415-444

Alvarez Francisco and Ester Camiña

Reciprocity in the Principal–Multiple Agent Model pp. 445-482

Giuseppe De Marco and Giovanni Immordino

Volume 13, issue 1, 2013

Dependence and Uniqueness in Bayesian Games pp. 1-25

Alan Beggs

Monopolistic Signal Provision† pp. 27-58

Rayo Luis

Multi-task Research and Research Joint Ventures pp. 59-77

La Manna Manfredi M.

Transparent Restrictions on Beliefs and Forward-Induction Reasoning in Games with Asymmetric Information pp. 79-130

Pierpaolo Battigalli and Andrea Prestipino

A Simple Bargaining Procedure for the Myerson Value pp. 131-150

Noemí Navarro and Perea Andres

On the Difference between Social and Private Goods pp. 151-177

Sandroni Alvaro, Sandra Ludwig and Kircher Philipp

Optimal Use of Rewards as Commitment Device When Bidding Is Costly pp. 179-189

Hu Luke

Labor Market and Search through Personal Contacts pp. 191-213

Chuhay Roman

Learning, Words and Actions: Experimental Evidence on Coordination-Improving Information pp. 215-247

Nicolas Jacquemet and Adam Zylbersztejn

Are Trust and Reciprocity Related within Individuals? pp. 249-270

Tamás Kovács and Marc Willinger

Optimal Contracting Model in a Social Environment and Trust-Related Psychological Costs pp. 271-284

Suren Basov and Muhammad Bhatti

Contract Bargaining with a Risk-Averse Agent pp. 285-301

Li Sanxi, Xiao Hao and Yao Dongmin

Academia or the Private Sector? Sorting of Agents into Institutions and an Outside Sector pp. 303-345

Andrea Craig and Marie-Louise Vierø

Poverty Orderings with Asymmetric Attributes pp. 347-361

Garcia-Diaz Rocio

Dictatorial Mechanisms in Constrained Combinatorial Auctions pp. 363-380

Anat Lerner and Gonen Rica

When Should a Monopolist Improve Quality in a Network Industry? pp. 381-414

Filomena Garcia

On Partially Honest Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies with Restricted Domains: A Sufficient Condition pp. 415-428

Ahmed Doghmi and Abderrahmane Ziad

Revenue Comparison in Asymmetric Auctions with Discrete Valuations pp. 429-461

Nicola Doni and Domenico Menicucci

Volume 12, issue 1, 2012

Dominance Solvability of Large k-Price Auctions pp. 11

Yaron Azrieli and Dan Levin

Strict Concavity of the Value Function for a Family of Dynamic Accumulation Models pp. 11

Eugenio Bobenrieth, Bobenrieth Juan R.A. and Brian Wright

On a Notion of Similarity with Endowments in Public Economics pp. 12

Kleinberg Norman L., Ma Barry and Weiss Jeffrey

Two Notes on the Blotto Game pp. 13

Jonathan Weinstein

Transparency, Career Concerns, and Incentives for Acquiring Expertise pp. 15

Heski Bar-Isaac

Treading a Fine Line: Characterisations and Impossibilities for Liberal Principles in Infinitely-Lived Societies pp. 16

Michele Lombardi and Roberto Veneziani

Behavior-Based Price Discrimination by a Patient Seller pp. 18

Sushil Bikhchandani and McCardle Kevin

An Axiomatization of Learning Rules when Counterfactuals are not Observed pp. 19

Friederike Mengel and Javier Rivas

On Rationalizability and Beliefs in Discrete Private-Value First-Price Auctions pp. 21

Jack Robles and Makoto Shimoji

On Communication and the Weak Sequential Core pp. 22

Routledge R. R.

Correlation in the Multiplayer Electronic Mail Game pp. 25

Coles Peter A. and Ran Shorrer

Asymmetric Single-peaked Preferences pp. 26

Francisco Martínez-Mora and M. Socorro Puy

A Folk Theorem for Games when Frequent Monitoring Decreases Noise pp. 27

António Osório

Multidimensional Product Differentiation with Discrete Characteristics pp. 27

Mariano Runco

Altruism and Local Interaction pp. 27

Jonas Hedlund

An Experimental Comparison of Sequential First- and Second-Price Auctions with Synergies pp. 28

Leufkens Kasper, Ronald Peeters and Marc Vorsatz

Education Signaling with Uncertain Returns pp. 31

Tali Regev

Seller Cheap Talk in Almost Common Value Auction pp. 31

Daniel Li

Preference for Variety pp. 32

Kaiser Karen and Rainer Schwabe

Career Concerns and Performance Reporting in Optimal Incentive Contracts pp. 32

Alexander Wolitzky

Outsourcing and Downstream R&D under Economies of Scale pp. 33

Chen Yutian and Debapriya Sen

Endogenous Preferences and Dynamic Contract Design pp. 34

Zhang Wei

An Axiomatic Approach to Arbitration and its Application in Bargaining Games pp. 34

Kang Rong

Revealing Private Information in Bargaining pp. 34

Gayer Gabrielle and Segev Ella

Characterizing Welfare-egalitarian Mechanisms with Solidarity When Valuations are Private Information pp. 35

Duygu Yengin

Uniquely Representing "A Preference for Uniformity" pp. 36

Chatterjee Kalyan and Krishna R. Vijay

Screening and Financial Contracting in the Face of Outside Competition pp. 40

Dan Bernhardt

Commitment versus Flexibility in Enforcement Games pp. 42

Leshem Shmuel and Tabbach Avraham D.

The Tennis Coach Problem: A Game-Theoretic and Experimental Study pp. 43

Arad Ayala

Information Theory and Observational Limitations in Decision Making pp. 43

Wolpert David and Leslie David S.

Intergenerational Interactions in Human Capital Accumulation pp. 47

Łukasz Woźny and Jakub Growiec

Strategic Effects of Renegotiation-Proof Contracts pp. 49

Emanuele Gerratana and Levent Kockesen

Consensual and Conflictual Democratization pp. 51

Matteo Cervellati, Piergiuseppe Fortunato and Uwe Sunde