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More than thirty years of ultimatum bargaining experiments: Motives, variations, and a survey of the recent literature

Werner Güth () and Martin Kocher ()

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2014, vol. 108, issue C, 396-409

Abstract: Take-it or leave-it offers are probably as old as mankind. Our objective here is, first, to provide a, probably subjectively colored, recollection of the initial ultimatum game experiment, its motivation and the immediate responses. Second, we discuss extensions of the standard ultimatum bargaining game in a unified framework, and, third, we offer a survey of the experimental ultimatum bargaining literature containing papers published since the turn of the century. The paper argues that the ultimatum game is a versatile tool for research in bargaining and on social preferences. Finally, we provide examples for open research questions and directions for future studies.

Keywords: Ultimatum bargaining; Ultimatum game; Experiment; Social preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Working Paper: More than thirty years of ultimatum bargaining experiments: Motives, variations, and a survey of the recent literature (2013) Downloads
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