More than Thirty Years of Ultimatum Bargaining Experiments: Motives, Variations, and a Survey of the Recent Literature

Werner Güth () and Martin Kocher

No 4380, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: Take-it or leave-it offers are probably as old as mankind. Our objective here is, first, to provide a, probably subjectively-colored, recollection of the initial ultimatum game experiment, its motivation and the immediate responses. Second, we discuss important extensions of the standard ultimatum bargaining game in a unified framework, and, third, we offer a survey of the experimental ultimatum bargaining literature containing papers published since the turn of the century. The paper argues that the ultimatum game is an extremely versatile tool for research in bargaining and on social preferences. Finally, we provide examples for open research questions and directions for future studies.

Keywords: ultimatum bargaining; experiment; social preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (21)

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Related works:
Journal Article: More than thirty years of ultimatum bargaining experiments: Motives, variations, and a survey of the recent literature (2014)
Working Paper: More than thirty years of ultimatum bargaining experiments: Motives, variations, and a survey of the recent literature (2013)
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