Evolutionary Norm Enforcement

Werner Gueth and Axel Ockenfels
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Werner Güth ()

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2000, vol. 156, issue 2, 335-

Abstract: Applying an indirect evolutionary approach with endogenous preference formation, we show that a legal system can induce players to reward trust even if material incentives dictate to exploit trust. By analyzing the crowding out or crowding in of trustworthiness implied by various verdict rules, we can assess how a court influences the share of kept promises of 'truly' trustworthy players who evolutionarily evolved as trustworthy and of opportunistic players woh are only trustworthy if inspired by material incentives.

JEL-codes: C73 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Evolutionary Norm Enforcement (2000)
Working Paper: Evolutionary norm enforcement (1999)
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