Evolutionary Norm Enforcement

Werner Güth () and Axel Ockenfels

No 331, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: Applying an indirect evolutionary approach with endogenous preference formation, we show that a legal system can induce players to reward trust even if material incentives dictate to exploit trust. By analyzing the crowding out or crowding in of trustworthiness implied by various verdict rules, we can assess how a court influences the share of kept promises of "truly" trustworthy players who evolutionarily evolved as trustworthy and of opportunistic players who are only trustworthy if inspired by material incentives.

Date: 2000
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Evolutionary Norm Enforcement (2000)
Working Paper: Evolutionary norm enforcement (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_331

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