Imitation and Belief Learning in an Oligopoly Experiment

Theo Offerman, Jan Potters and Joep Sonnemans ()

The Review of Economic Studies, 2002, vol. 69, issue 4, 973-997

Abstract: We examine the force of three types of behavioural dynamics in quantity-setting triopoly experiments: (1) mimicking the successful firm, (2) rules based on following the exemplary firm, and (3) rules based on belief learning. Theoretically, these three types of rules lead to the competitive, the collusive, and the Cournot—Nash outcome, respectively. In the experiment we employ three information treatments, each of which is hypothesized to be conducive to the force of one of the three dynamic rules. To a large extent, the results are consistent with the hypothesized relationships between treatments, behavioural rules, and outcomes. Copyright 2002, Wiley-Blackwell.

Date: 2002
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Working Paper: Imitation and belief learning in an oligopoly experiment (2002)
Working Paper: Imitation and Belief Learning in an Oligopoly Experiment (1997)
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