Imitation and Belief Learning in an Oligopoly Experiment

Theo Offerman (), Jan Potters and Joep Sonnemans ()

No 97-116/1, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute

Abstract: We examine the force of three types of behavioral dynamics in quantity-setting triopoly experiments:mimicking the successful firm,following the exemplary firm, andbelief learning.Theoretically, these three rules of dynamic conduct lead to the competitive, the collusive, and the Cournot-Nash outcome, respectively. In the experiment we employ three information treatments. Each of these treatments is hypothesized to be conducive to the force of one of the three dynamic rules. To a large extent, the results are consistent with the hypothesized relationships between treatments, dynamic rules, and outcomes.

Keywords: quantity-setting oligopoly game; imitation; belief learning; experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997-11-21
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Imitation and Belief Learning in an Oligopoly Experiment (2002)
Working Paper: Imitation and belief learning in an oligopoly experiment (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tin:wpaper:19970116

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