Rationality and Society

1989 - 2026

Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().

Access Statistics for this journal.
Is something missing from the series or not right? See the RePEc data check for the archive and series.

INTRODUCTION pp. 363-369: Peter Abell
AN ECONOMIST'S VIEW OF AUTHORITY pp. 371-386: Oliver Hart
ON CONTROL LOSSES IN HIERARCHIES pp. 387-412: Saikat Datta
COOPERATION IN CONTESTS pp. 413-432: Diane J. Reyniers
A MODEL OF THE INFORMAL STRUCTURE (CULTURE) OF ORGANIZATIONS pp. 433-452: Peter Abell
CHOICE CHARACTERISTICS AND PARENTS' CHILD-CARE DECISIONS pp. 453-495: Sandra L. Hofferth, Duncan D. Chaplin, Douglas A. Wissoker and Philip Robins
EDITOR'S NOTE pp. 497-497: Mary C. Brinton
`RATIONAL CHOICE, PUBLIC POLICY AND AIDS' pp. 498-502: Tomas Philipson and Richard Posner
COMMENT ON HECKATHORN AND BROADHEAD pp. 503-508: John H. Gagnon
COMMENT ON HECKATHORN AND BROADHEAD pp. 509-510: Jane J. Mansbridge
RATIONAL CHOICE, SOCIOLOGY AND AIDS pp. 511-518: Douglas D. Heckathorn and Robert S. Broadhead

RATIONAL CHOICE, PUBLIC POLICY AND AIDS pp. 235-260: Douglas D. Heckathorn and Robert S. Broadhead
THE TECHNOLOGICAL OBSOLESCENCE OF SCIENTIFIC FRAUD pp. 261-276: Susan Feigenbaum and David Levy
SOCIAL NORMS, INFLATION AND STABILIZATION pp. 277-294: Daniel Arce
USING COMPUTATIONAL METHODS TO PERFORM COUNTERFACTUAL ANALYSES OF FORMAL THEORIES pp. 295-323: Andrew D. Martin and Kevin M. Quinn
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TIANANMEN SQUARE pp. 325-342: Gary Shiu and Daniel Sutter
WAS ADAM SMITH AN ECONOMIST? pp. 343-347: Kevin L. Brown
YES, ADAM SMITH WAS AN ECONOMIST (A VERY MODERN ONE INDEED) pp. 348-352: Stephen Meardon and Andreas Ortmann
ON POLITICAL CORRECTNESS pp. 353-357: Phil Ryan
RESPONSE TO RYAN pp. 358-360: Glenn C. Loury

THE `COGNITIVIST MODEL' pp. 123-150: Raymond Boudon
FRAMES, INFERENCES AND RATIONALITY pp. 151-165: Renaud Fillieule
COGNITION IN SEEMINGLY RISKLESS CHOICES AND JUDGMENTS pp. 167-185: Louis LÃ©vy-Garboua and Claude Montmarquette
MARRIAGE PARADOXES pp. 187-206: Bruno Frey and Reiner Eichenberger
RATIONAL CHOICE AND THE TSL MODEL OF OCCUPATIONAL OPPORTUNITY pp. 207-230: John Allen Logan

DO ARTISTS SUFFER FROM A COST-DISEASE? pp. 5-24: Tyler Cowen and Robin Grier
POLITICAL CONTROL OF IMPLEMENTATION AGENCIES pp. 25-56: RenÃ© Torenvlied
SELF-COMMAND IN ADAM SMITH'S THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS pp. 57-80: Stephen Meardon and Andreas Ortmann
DYNAMICS OF THE RELIGIOUS ECONOMY pp. 81-110: James D. Montgomery
COMMENT ON BURT AND KNEZ'S THIRD-PARTY EFFECTS ON TRUST pp. 111-116: David Krackhardt
A FURTHER NOTE ON THE NETWORK STRUCTURE OF TRUST pp. 117-120: Ronald S. Burt and Marc Knez

About the Authors pp. 365-366: N/a
Interpersonal Allocation Continuous with Intertemporal Allocation pp. 367-392: Julian L. Simon
A Utility-Maximizing Mechanism for Vicarious Reward pp. 393-403: George Ainslie
On Modeling Interpersonal Behavior pp. 404-415: Dennis C. Mueller
Gifts with Strings Attached pp. 416-420: David Sally
Reply to Comment pp. 421-430: Julian L. Simon
Experiments with Social Traps IV pp. 431-441: Anatol Rapoport, Andreas Diekmann and Axel Franzen
Trust and Strategic Rationality pp. 442-464: Bernd Lahno
Intra-Level and Inter-Level Interaction pp. 465-488: Kjell Hausken
Comment on Cornell pp. 489-491: Michael Hechter
A Hypothesis Regarding the Origins of Ethnic Discrimination pp. 491-493: Bradford Cornell
In What Way Could Political Correctness be Beneficial? pp. 493-497: Mike Reay
Response to Comment of Mike Reay pp. 497-498: Glenn C. Loury

About the Authors pp. 251-252: N/a
James S. Coleman, Founding Editor pp. 253-254: Mary C. Brinton
Kinds of Third-Party Effects on Trust pp. 255-292: Ronald S. Burt and Marc Knez
When Rationality Fails pp. 293-320: Phillip Bonacich and Elisa Jayne Bienenstock
Uncertain Property Rights and the Coase Theorem pp. 321-327: Maurice Schiff
Experiments with Social Traps III pp. 328-337: Anatol Rapoport, Andreas Diekmann and Axel Franzen
Rationality and Socialist Collective Farming pp. 338-357: Kyung-Sup Chang

About the Authors pp. 139-140: N/a
Individual Rights, Emergent Social States, and Behavioral Feasibility pp. 141-150: James Buchanan
The Length of Legislative Sessions and the Growth of Government pp. 151-155: Mwangi Kimenyi and Robert Tollison
Persistent Cyclical Consumption pp. 156-166: Franz Wirl and Gustav Feichtinger
Individual Thresholds and Social Diffusion pp. 167-182: Norman Braun
Group Size and One-Shot Collective Action pp. 183-200: Axel Franzen
Evolution and Revolution pp. 201-224: Cristina Bicchieri and Carlo Rovelli
Leadership Games in Collective Action pp. 225-246: Josep M. Colomer

About the Authors pp. 3-3: N/a
A Hypothesis Regarding the Origins of Ethnic Discrimination pp. 4-30: Bradford Cornell
Marginality pp. 31-57: David D. Laitin
Conversation and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas pp. 58-92: David Sally
Markets, Norms, and Peasant Rebellions pp. 93-115: Jose Edgardo L. Campos and Hilton Root
Comment pp. 116-120: Gordon Tullock
Response pp. 120-123: Jack Goldstone
Rebels with a Cause pp. 123-126: Manfred Tietzel and Marion Weber
The 5% Rule pp. 126-128: Mark I. Lichbach