Rationality and Society

1989 - 2026

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About the Authors pp. 379-379: N/a
Editor's Introduction pp. 380-380: James S. Coleman
The Rational Choice Perspective pp. 381-410: Neil J. Smelser
On the Need to Make a Better Job of Justifying Rational Choice Theory pp. 411-420: Mary K. Farmer
We Are Smarter than We Think pp. 421-436: Gudmund Hernes
Rationality and Formal Theory pp. 437-450: Thomas J. Fararo
Rational Choice and the Limits of Theoretical Generality pp. 451-469: James B. Rule
The Understanding of Religious Vitality Needs Additional Factors pp. 470-474: Raymond Boudon
Market and Political Explanations of Religious Vitality pp. 474-476: Xiaoxi Tong
Reply to Boudon and Tong pp. 476-480: Mark Chaves and David E. Cann

About the Authors pp. 259-260: N/a
Do Catholic Societies Really Exist? pp. 261-271: Rodney Stark
Regulation, Pluralism, and Religious Market Structure pp. 272-290: Mark Chaves and David E. Cann
Religion, Context, and Constraint toward Strangers pp. 291-307: John Orbell, Marion Goldman, Matthew Mulford and Robyn Dawes
When is a Distribution Rule Just? pp. 308-331: Karen A. Hegtvedt
Individual, Collective, and Systems Rationality in Work Groups pp. 332-355: Trond Petersen
Comment on â€œAn Economic Argument for Affirmative Actionâ€ pp. 356-360: David Friedman
Evaluating an Argument for Affirmative Action pp. 360-364: James Heckman and Tomas Philipson
Comment on the Article by Dean Foster and Rakesh Vohra, â€œAn Economic Argument for Affirmative Actionâ€ pp. 364-367: Glenn C. Loury
Response to Comments pp. 368-369: Dean Foster and Rakesh Vohra

About the Authors pp. 131-132: N/a
Civic Norms, Social Sanctions, and Voter Turnout pp. 133-156: Stephen Knack
Social Capital, Labor Mobility, and Welfare pp. 157-175: Maurice Schiff
An Economic Argument for Affirmative Action pp. 176-188: Dean Foster and Rakesh V. Vohra
Desegregation and Social Monopoly Pricing pp. 189-198: Tomas Philipson
Another Experimental Look at Individual Time Preference pp. 199-220: James H. Holcomb and Paul S. Nelson
On the Stability of Occupational Rankings pp. 221-233: Yoram Weiss and Chaim Fershtman
In Defense of Reciprocity pp. 234-239: Burt L. Monroe
The Limits of Reciprocity Reaffirmed pp. 239-242: Juan Martinez Coll and Jack Hirshleifer
An Empirical Test of Iannaccone's Sophisticated Model of Regulated Religious Markets pp. 243-247: Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier
Response to Box-Steffensmeier pp. 247-251: Laurence R. Iannaccone

About the Authors pp. 5-6: N/a
Editor's Introduction pp. 7-7: James S. Coleman
Indispensable Framework or Just another Ideology? pp. 8-23: Aaron Wildavsky
Games and Preference pp. 24-32: Gordon Tullock
The Insufficiency of Game Theory for the Resolution of Real-World Collective Action Problems pp. 33-40: Michael Hechter
Views on the Relevance of Game Theory pp. 41-50: James Friedman
In Defense of Game Theory pp. 51-61: John Harsanyi
On the Value of Game Theory in Social Science pp. 62-73: Roger Myerson
Game Theory Defined pp. 74-82: Anatol Rapoport
Heterogeneous Players and Specialized Models pp. 83-94: Eric Rasmusen
On the Usefulness of Game Theory for the Resolution of Real-World Collective Action Problems pp. 95-102: Werner Raub, Thomas Voss and Jeroen Weesie
What Games? Why Equilibria? Which Equilibria? pp. 103-116: Piotr Swistak
Pascal's Wager and the Limits of Rational Choice pp. 117-121: James D. Montgomery
Response to Montgomery pp. 121-122: John T. Durkin and Andrew M. Greeley

About the Authors pp. 395-395: N/a
The Origins of Democracy in England pp. 396-422: Edgar Kiser and Yoram Barzel
Functionality, Rent Seeking, and Government as Determinants of Inequality pp. 423-436: Erich Weede
The Price of Influence in an Interest-Group Economy pp. 437-449: W. Crain, Robert Tollison and Thomas H. Deaton
Patterns of Distribution in Spatial Games pp. 450-474: Cheryl L. Eavey
Why is Information Asymmetrical? pp. 475-495: F. G. Bailey
Comments on Long's â€œTaking Interests Seriouslyâ€ pp. 496-500: Kevin L. Brown
Comments on â€œTaking Interests Seriouslyâ€ pp. 500-503: James S. Coleman
Interests according to Long pp. 503-505: Rudolf Schuessler
Reply to Brown, Coleman, and Schuessler pp. 505-509: Douglas G. Long

About the Authors pp. 275-276: N/a
Patterns of Causal Analysis in Tocqueville's Democracy in America pp. 277-297: Jon Elster
Elster's Tocqueville pp. 298-307: Dick Pels
Tocqueville and the Ambivalences of Democracy pp. 308-316: Frank Ankersmit
The Dynamics of Income Inequality in a Representative Democracy pp. 317-342: Peter van WIJCK and Wil Arts
Taking Interests Seriously pp. 343-364: Douglas Long
Acting together, Contributing together pp. 365-380: Russell Hardin
Comment on Jankowski's â€œPunishment in Iterated Chicken and Prisoner's Dilemma Gamesâ€ pp. 381-385: Jeffrey Banks
Nash Versus Evolutionary Equilibria and the Folk Theorem pp. 386-389: Richard Jankowski

About the Authors pp. 155-155: N/a
The Consequences of Religious Market Structure pp. 156-177: Laurence R. Iannaccone
A Model of Religious Choice Under Uncertainty pp. 178-196: John T. Durkin and Andrew M. Greeley
On Love and Altruism pp. 197-214: Friedel Bolle
Processes of Collective Political Action pp. 215-251: Karl-Dieter Opp
Comments on Scharpf's â€œGames Real Actors could Playâ€ pp. 252-257: Steven Brams
Demand for, and Supply of, Institutions pp. 258-260: Bruno Frey
Response to Steven J. Brams and Bruno S. Frey pp. 261-265: Fritz W. Scharpf
Comment on Tsebelis's â€œPenalty has no Impact on Crimeâ€ pp. 266-268: Thomas F. Mayer
Response to Mayer pp. 269-271: George Tsebelis

In Memoriam pp. 3-3: George D. McCune
About the Authors pp. 4-5: N/a
Fairness and Secrecy pp. 6-34: John R. Chamberlin and Kim Lane Scheppele
The Limits of Reciprocity pp. 35-64: Juan Martinez Coll and Jack Hirshleifer
The Relative Efficiency of Approval and Condorcet Voting Procedures pp. 65-77: Samuel Merrill and Nicolaus Tideman
The World Language Problem pp. 78-105: Jonathan Pool
Egoism, Parochialism, and Universalism pp. 106-132: Peregrine Schwartz-Shea and Randy T. Simmons
â€œSocial Production Functions, Deficits, and Social Revolutionsâ€ pp. 133-136: Wayne T. Brough and V Elliott
A Missed Chance and Still Useful pp. 137-141: Siegwart Lindenberg
â€œPenalty has no Impact on Crimeâ€ pp. 142-143: Gordon Tullock
Response to Gordon Tullock pp. 144-147: George Tsebelis