Rationality and Society

1989 - 2025

Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().

Access Statistics for this journal.
Is something missing from the series or not right? See the RePEc data check for the archive and series.

About the Authors pp. 395-395: N/a
The Origins of Democracy in England pp. 396-422: Edgar Kiser and Yoram Barzel
Functionality, Rent Seeking, and Government as Determinants of Inequality pp. 423-436: Erich Weede
The Price of Influence in an Interest-Group Economy pp. 437-449: W. Crain, Robert Tollison and Thomas H. Deaton
Patterns of Distribution in Spatial Games pp. 450-474: Cheryl L. Eavey
Why is Information Asymmetrical? pp. 475-495: F. G. Bailey
Comments on Long's â€œTaking Interests Seriouslyâ€ pp. 496-500: Kevin L. Brown
Comments on â€œTaking Interests Seriouslyâ€ pp. 500-503: James S. Coleman
Interests according to Long pp. 503-505: Rudolf Schuessler
Reply to Brown, Coleman, and Schuessler pp. 505-509: Douglas G. Long

About the Authors pp. 275-276: N/a
Patterns of Causal Analysis in Tocqueville's Democracy in America pp. 277-297: Jon Elster
Elster's Tocqueville pp. 298-307: Dick Pels
Tocqueville and the Ambivalences of Democracy pp. 308-316: Frank Ankersmit
The Dynamics of Income Inequality in a Representative Democracy pp. 317-342: Peter van WIJCK and Wil Arts
Taking Interests Seriously pp. 343-364: Douglas Long
Acting together, Contributing together pp. 365-380: Russell Hardin
Comment on Jankowski's â€œPunishment in Iterated Chicken and Prisoner's Dilemma Gamesâ€ pp. 381-385: Jeffrey Banks
Nash Versus Evolutionary Equilibria and the Folk Theorem pp. 386-389: Richard Jankowski

About the Authors pp. 155-155: N/a
The Consequences of Religious Market Structure pp. 156-177: Laurence R. Iannaccone
A Model of Religious Choice Under Uncertainty pp. 178-196: John T. Durkin and Andrew M. Greeley
On Love and Altruism pp. 197-214: Friedel Bolle
Processes of Collective Political Action pp. 215-251: Karl-Dieter Opp
Comments on Scharpf's â€œGames Real Actors could Playâ€ pp. 252-257: Steven Brams
Demand for, and Supply of, Institutions pp. 258-260: Bruno Frey
Response to Steven J. Brams and Bruno S. Frey pp. 261-265: Fritz W. Scharpf
Comment on Tsebelis's â€œPenalty has no Impact on Crimeâ€ pp. 266-268: Thomas F. Mayer
Response to Mayer pp. 269-271: George Tsebelis

In Memoriam pp. 3-3: George D. McCune
About the Authors pp. 4-5: N/a
Fairness and Secrecy pp. 6-34: John R. Chamberlin and Kim Lane Scheppele
The Limits of Reciprocity pp. 35-64: Juan Martinez Coll and Jack Hirshleifer
The Relative Efficiency of Approval and Condorcet Voting Procedures pp. 65-77: Samuel Merrill and Nicolaus Tideman
The World Language Problem pp. 78-105: Jonathan Pool
Egoism, Parochialism, and Universalism pp. 106-132: Peregrine Schwartz-Shea and Randy T. Simmons
â€œSocial Production Functions, Deficits, and Social Revolutionsâ€ pp. 133-136: Wayne T. Brough and V Elliott
A Missed Chance and Still Useful pp. 137-141: Siegwart Lindenberg
â€œPenalty has no Impact on Crimeâ€ pp. 142-143: Gordon Tullock
Response to Gordon Tullock pp. 144-147: George Tsebelis

About the Authors pp. 411-411: N/a
Substantive Positivism and the Idea of Crime pp. 412-428: Travis Hirschi and Michael Gottfredson
Collectivities as Actors pp. 429-448: Scott L. Feld and Bernard Grofman
Punishment in Iterated Chicken and Prisoner's Dilemma Games pp. 449-470: Richard Jankowski
Games Real Actors Could Play pp. 471-494: Fritz W. Scharpf
Denzin on Rational Choice Theory pp. 495-499: Peter Abell
Reading Denzin pp. 500-503: Michael Hechter
The Long Good-Bye: Farewell to Rational Choice Theory pp. 504-507: Norman K. Denzin
Comments on Tsebelis pp. 508-511: Anatol Apoport
Response to Rapoport pp. 512-516: George Tsebelis
Comments on England and Kilbourne pp. 517-521: Debra Friedman and Carol Diem
Does Rational Choice Theory Assume a Separative Self? pp. 522-525: Paula England and Barbara Stanek Kilbourne

About the Authors pp. 253-254: N/a
Penalty has no Impact on Crime pp. 255-286: George Tsebelis
The Theory of Binding Commitments Simplified and Extended, with Generalization to Interpersonal Allocation pp. 287-309: Julian L. Simon
The Utility of Bilingualism pp. 310-334: Josep M. Colomer
The Nature of Common-Pool Resource Problems pp. 335-358: Roy Gardner, Elinor Ostrom and James Walker
On the Formation of Exchange Relations in Political Systems pp. 359-378: Joel Podolny
Comment on Root's â€œTying the King's Handsâ€ pp. 379-382: John Markoff
Comment on Root's â€œTyping the King's Handsâ€ pp. 383-385: Margaret Levi
Response to Markoff and Levi pp. 386-390: Hilton Root
Comment on Weesie's â€œParticipation in Voluntary Organizations and Group Sizeâ€ pp. 391-393: James Montgomery
The Limits of Unraveling in Democratically Governed Groups pp. 394-398: Stephen Ansolabehere
Reply to Ansolabehere pp. 399-401: Paul E. Johnson

Errata pp. 133-134: N/a
Rational Choice Models for Sociology â€” Pro and Con pp. 137-141: Paul M. Hirsch
The Attainment of Solidarity in Intentional Communities pp. 142-155: Michael Hechter
Feminist Critiques of the Separative Model of Self pp. 156-171: Paula England and Barbara Stanek Kilbourne
Reading Rational Choice Theory pp. 172-189: Norman K. Denzin
Rhetoric of Reason, Rhetoric of Passion pp. 190-213: Jonathan Rieder
Comment pp. 214-223: Arthur L. Stinchcombe
Comment on Boudon pp. 224-228: Richard A. Shweder
Comment on Boudon pp. 229-233: Kevin L. Brown
Response to Shweder and Brown pp. 234-237: Raymond Boudon
Comment on Macy pp. 238-241: Piotr Swistak
Reply to Swistak pp. 242-247: Michael W. Macy

About the Authors pp. 3-3: N/a
Unraveling in Democratically Governed Groups pp. 4-34: Paul Edward Johnson
Participation in Voluntary Organizations and Group Size pp. 35-66: Jeroen Weesie
A General Game-Theoretic Model of Preference Adaptations in Problematic Social Situations pp. 67-93: Werner Raub
Rational Organization pp. 94-105: James S. Coleman
In Memoriam: Stefan Nowak pp. 106-106: N/a
Constitutions and Institutions pp. 107-111: Anthony Scott
Comments on Elinor Ostrom pp. 112-116: Gary D. Libecap
Response to Comments by Anthony Scott and Gary Libecap pp. 117-117: Elinor Ostrom
Modeling the Second-Order Problem is not Easy pp. 118-122: Pamela E. Oliver
Modeling the Second-Order Free-Rider Problem pp. 123-127: Douglas D. Heckathorn