Dishonesty under scrutiny

Jeroen van de Ven () and Marie Claire Villeval

Journal of the Economic Science Association, 2015, vol. 1, issue 1, No 8, 86-99

Abstract: Abstract We investigate how different forms of scrutiny affect dishonesty, using Gneezy’s [Am Econ Rev 95:384–394 (2005)] deception game. We add a third player whose interests are aligned with those of the sender. We find that lying behavior is not sensitive to revealing the sender’s identity to the observer. The option for observers to communicate with the sender, and the option to reveal the sender’s lies to the receiver also do not affect lying behavior. Even more striking, senders whose identity is revealed to their observer do not lie less when their interests are misaligned with those of the observer.

Keywords: Deception; Lies; Dishonesty; Social image; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (23)

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Working Paper: Dishonesty under scrutiny (2015)
Working Paper: Dishonesty under scrutiny (2014)
Working Paper: Dishonesty under scrutiny (2014)
Working Paper: Dishonesty under Scrutiny (2014)
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DOI: 10.1007/s40881-015-0002-6

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