Dishonesty under scrutiny
Jeroen van de Ven () and
Marie Claire Villeval ()
No 1427, Working Papers from Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon
We investigate how different forms of scrutiny affect dishonesty, using Gneezy’s (2005) deception game. We add a third player whose interests are aligned with those of the sender. We find that lying behavior is not sensitive to revealing the sender’s identity to the observer. The option for observers to communicate with the sender, and the option to reveal the sender’s lies to the receiver also do not affect lying behavior. Even more striking, senders whose identity is revealed to their observer do not lie less when their interests are misaligned with those of the observer.
Keywords: Deception; lies; dishonesty; social image; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-hpe and nep-soc
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Working Paper: Dishonesty under scrutiny (2015)
Working Paper: Dishonesty under scrutiny (2014)
Working Paper: Dishonesty under Scrutiny (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gat:wpaper:1427
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