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Dishonesty under Scrutiny

Jeroen van de Ven () and Marie Claire Villeval ()

No 8638, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: We investigate how different forms of scrutiny affect dishonesty, using Gneezy's (2005) deception game. We add a third player whose interests are aligned with those of the sender. We find that lying behavior is not sensitive to revealing the sender's identity to the observer. The option for observers to communicate with the sender, and the option to reveal the sender's lies to the receiver also do not affect lying behavior. Even more striking, senders whose identity is revealed to their observer do not lie less when their interests are misaligned with those of the observer.

Keywords: deception; lies; dishonesty; social image; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-hpe and nep-soc
Date: 2014-11
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Published in: Journal of the Economic Science Association, 2015, 1, 86-99

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Related works:
Working Paper: Dishonesty under scrutiny (2015) Downloads
Working Paper: Dishonesty under scrutiny (2014) Downloads
Working Paper: Dishonesty under scrutiny (2014) Downloads
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