Endogenous Lobbying

Leonardo Felli and Antonio Merlo

Journal of the European Economic Association, 2006, vol. 4, issue 1, 180-215

Abstract: In this article, we present a citizen-candidate model of representative democracy with endogenouslobbying.We find that lobbying induces policy compromise and always affects equilibrium policy outcomes. In particular, even though the policy preferences of lobbies are relatively extreme, lobbying biases the outcome of the political process toward the center of the policy space, and extreme policies cannot emerge in equilibrium. Moreover, in equilibrium, not all lobbies participate in the policy-making process. (JEL: D72, D74, D78) Copyright (c) 2006 by the European Economic Association.

Date: 2006
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Related works:
Working Paper: Endogenous Lobbying (2004)
Working Paper: Endogenous Lobbying (2003)
Working Paper: Endogenous lobbying (2003)
Working Paper: Endogenous Lobbying (2002)
Working Paper: Endogenous Lobbying (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tpr:jeurec:v:4:y:2006:i:1:p:180-215

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