Endogenous Lobbying

Leonardo Felli and Antonio Merlo

No 3174, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: In this paper, we present a citizen-candidate model of representative democracy with endogenous lobbying. We find that lobbying induces policy compromise and always affects equilibrium policy outcomes. In particular, even though the policy preferences of lobbies are relatively extreme, lobbying biases the outcome of the political process toward the center of the policy space, and extreme policies cannot emerge in equilibrium. Moreover, in equilibrium, not all lobbies participate in the policy-making process.

Keywords: Endogenous lobbying; Citizen-candidate model; Representative democracy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D74 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Endogenous Lobbying (2004)
Working Paper: Endogenous Lobbying (2003)
Working Paper: Endogenous lobbying (2003)
Working Paper: Endogenous Lobbying (2000)
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