Endogenous lobbying

Leonardo Felli and Antonio Merlo

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: In this paper we present a citizen-candidate model of representative democracy with endogenous lobbying. We find that lobbying induces policy compromise and always affects equilibrium policy outcomes. In particular, even though the policy preferences of lobbies are relatively extreme, lobbying biases the outcome of the political process toward the centre of the policy space, and extreme policies cannot emerge in equilibrium. Moreover, in equilibrium, not all lobbies participate in the policy-making process.

Keywords: Endogenous lobbying; citizen-candidate model; representative democracy. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D74 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 35 pages
Date: 2003-02
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http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/3590/ Open access version. (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Endogenous Lobbying (2006)
Working Paper: Endogenous Lobbying (2004)
Working Paper: Endogenous Lobbying (2003)
Working Paper: Endogenous Lobbying (2002)
Working Paper: Endogenous Lobbying (2000)
Working Paper: Endogenous Lobbying
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:3590

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