Endogenous Lobbying

Leonardo Felli and Antonio Merlo

STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series from Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE

Abstract: In this paper we present a citizen-candidate model of representative democracy with endogenous lobbying. We find that lobbying induces policy compromise and always affects equilibrium policy outcomes. In particular, even though the policy preferences of lobbies are relatively extreme, lobbying biases the outcome of the political process toward the centre of the policy space, and extreme policies cannot emerge in equilibrium. Moreover, in equilibrium, not all lobbies participate in the policy-making process.

Keywords: Endogenous lobbying; citizen-candidate model; representative democracy. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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https://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/dps/te/te448.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Endogenous Lobbying (2006)
Working Paper: Endogenous Lobbying (2004)
Working Paper: Endogenous lobbying (2003)
Working Paper: Endogenous Lobbying (2002)
Working Paper: Endogenous Lobbying (2000)
Working Paper: Endogenous Lobbying
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cep:stitep:448

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