Endogenous Lobbying

Leonardo Felli and Antonio Merlo

No 291, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: In this paper we endogenize the number and characteristics of lobbies in a citizen-candidate model of representative democracy where citizens can lobby an elected policy-maker. We find that lobbying always matters. That is, lobbying always affects equilibrium policy outcomes. Moreover, only one policy outcome emerges in equilibrium. An "extremist" candidate is elected and implements a "centrist" policy that differs from the one most preferred by the median voter. These results are in contrast with the ones obtained in the context of a citizen-candidate model where lobbies are exogenous.

Keywords: Lobbying; citizen-candidate; representative democracy; electoral competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Endogenous Lobbying (2006)
Working Paper: Endogenous Lobbying (2004)
Working Paper: Endogenous Lobbying (2003)
Working Paper: Endogenous lobbying (2003)
Working Paper: Endogenous Lobbying (2002)
Working Paper: Endogenous Lobbying
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_291

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